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wrongful conviction or wide disparities in sentencing, however, challenge this premise. While legal scholars
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Aid Ontario during 2007–2013, we find that outcomes in routine criminal cases vary in ways not summarily
explained by differences in defendant or city characteristics. Cities differ in their use and expenditure of
defendant legal representation in ways strongly correlated with outcomes, controlling for other factors. While
only a first step, our article counsels strongly in favour of a systematic examination of case adjudication in
Canada, and offers future avenues for research.
Keywords
Criminal Law
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol53/iss2/7
587
Equality Before the Law? Evaluating 
Criminal Case Outcomes in Canada
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK AND ALBERT YOON*
One of our most strongly held ideals is that individuals receive equal treatment under the 
law. Incidents of wrongful conviction or wide disparities in sentencing, however, challenge 
this premise. While legal scholars have recently examined this premise, our understanding 
remains largely normative or anecdotal. Scholars have begun to identify factors that 
influence legal outcomes, yet this question has remained largely unexplored in Canada. This 
article seeks to advance this inquiry. Using unique data from both the Ontario courts and 
Legal Aid Ontario during 2007–2013, we find that outcomes in routine criminal cases vary in 
ways not summarily explained by differences in defendant or city characteristics. Cities differ 
in their use and expenditure of defendant legal representation in ways strongly correlated 
with outcomes, controlling for other factors. While only a first step, our article counsels 
strongly in favour of a systematic examination of case adjudication in Canada, and offers 
future avenues for research.
L’un des idéaux qui nous sont les plus chers veut que tous soient égaux devant la loi. Des 
condamnations injustifiées et la grande disparité des sentences remettent toutefois en 
question cette prémisse. Même si des juristes ont récemment étudié cette situation, notre 
perception demeure largement normative et anecdotique. Des spécialistes commencent 
à comprendre les facteurs qui influencent les jugements, mais cette question demeure le 
plus souvent ténébreuse au Canada. Cet article cherche à faire progresser cette enquête. 
À partir de données particulières émanant tant des cours ontariennes que de l’aidejuridique 
* Both authors are at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. The authors would like to 
thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada for their 
generous support. We are grateful to Jim Anderson at the Ministry of the Attorney General 
of Ontario, and Anuerin Thomas, Rod Strin, and Ivan Yablonovsky at Legal Aid Ontario 
for making their data available, and their helpful comments. The authors received helpful 
feedback from workshop participants at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law Workshop. 
Ben Alarie, Anthony Doob, Martin Friedland, Marc Galanter, Andrew Green, Ed Iacobucci, 
Helen Levy, Anthony Niblett, and Hamish Stewart also provided valuable feedback.  
All remaining errors are our own.
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de cette province entre 2007 et 2013, nous découvrons que les résultats de causes 
criminelles routinières varient d’une manière que n’expliquent facilement ni les différences 
entre défendeurs, ni les caractéristiques des villes. Les villes diffèrent dans leur recours 
à l’aide juridique et le budget qui y est affecté d’une manière fortement liée aux résultats, 
compte tenu des autres facteurs. Même s’il ne constitue qu’un premier pas, notre article 
recommande fortement un examen systématique des sentences prononcées au Canada et 
ouvre la voie à de futures recherches.
IN ALMOST EVERY DEVELOPED COUNTRY, Canada included,1 society holds as 
an ideal that citizens receive equal treatment under the law. That is to say, the 
outcome of a given case may turn on the alleged wrongdoing, but not the parties’ 
gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. Even the casual observer of our legal 
system, however, can point to notable incidents—or even personal experience—
where reality has fallen short of this ideal. Examples of criminal defendants 
1. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. Section 15 of the Charter 
states that “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”
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wrongly convicted for crimes they did not commit suggest that our laws in fact 
may not apply equally to everyone.2
There are many potential explanations for differential treatment when it 
occurs. The first is individual. Each case is unique, and its specific characteristics—
such as the strength of the prima facie case or the personal circumstances of 
the parties—influence the claims alleged, the remedy or penalty sought, and the 
ultimate outcome. These individual differences are often nuanced and not easily 
captured in court records.
Another explanation is institutional: Jurisdictions may differ from one 
another in their approach to the law, manifesting itself in the way that police 
enforce existing laws in deciding whether to make an arrest, how the Crown 
determines which cases to pursue and the charges it brings forward, and how 
judges adjudicate cases. Even within the same province, individual police 
departments, Crown offices, and courts may differ in their exercise of discretion.
Legal representation also may affect outcomes. Litigants vary in their ability to 
afford legal representation.3 Indigent criminal defendants are eligible for publicly 
funded representation, particularly when the criminal charges entail a likelihood 
of incarceration;4 in the civil context, such rights are much more limited, and in 
many situations, individuals engage in litigation without representation. 
While scholars in other countries have examined factors that influence case 
outcomes,5 such research is less developed in Canada. The existing scholarship 
in this country focuses primarily on the macro level, examining segments of the 
population (e.g., middle-income litigants) who often lack the resources to pay for 
2. Allan Maki describes a recent example in which Leighton Hay was wrongfully convicted for 
a nightclub murder in 2002, and freed only after his successful appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. See Allan Maki, “Wrongfully convicted of murder, Leighton Hay free after 12 
Years,” The Globe and Mail (28 November 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
national/wrongly-convicted-of-murder-leighton-hay-free-after-12-years/article21825039>.
3. See e.g. Ab Currie, “A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low- and 
Moderate-Income Canadians: Incidence and Patterns” (2006) 13:3 Int’l J Legal Prof 217.
4. Indigent criminal defendants charged with a criminal offence may qualify for duty or 
certificate counsel. For a description of eligibility for duty and certificate counsel, see “Am I 
eligible for a legal aid certificate?” (2015) Legal Aid Ontario, online: <www.legalaid.on.ca/en/
getting/eligibility.asp>.
5. See infra notes 14, 22, 23, and accompanying text.
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a lawyer.6 Largely ignored is a microanalysis that examines the factors that lead to 
disparities in outcomes across individual, similarly situated, litigants. 
This article seeks to advance our understanding of this question. We conduct 
a study drawing from two unique data sources. The first is the Ontario courts, 
which generously provided case outcomes for low-level offences—assault, theft/
robbery, driving under the influence (DUI), and narcotics—for the entire 
province for the period 2007–2013. The second is Legal Aid Ontario (“LAO”), 
which kindly provided the number of lawyers and expenses for each type of lawyer 
that it funds—staff, per diem, and certificate counsel—for the same period. 
Our goals are threefold: one, to analyze the available data and identify the 
differences in case outcomes in criminal cases in Ontario; two, to examine the 
factors that may contribute to these differences, sensitive to the limitations of our 
data; and three, to explore future research that might increase our understanding 
of case adjudication in Canada. To our knowledge, this article represents the first 
micro-level exploration of this question.
Our analysis generates two main findings. The first is that in Ontario, case 
outcomes vary widely across cities, and in ways that defendant characteristics 
(e.g., age and gender) and city-level demographics cannot easily explain. This 
variation endures even when limiting our analysis to individual offences or cases 
where the defendant faces only a single charge, as opposed to multiple charges 
of the same offence or additional, more serious offences. The second is that case 
outcomes strongly correlate with the type of legal representation the defendant 
receives. Some of this correlation may reflect elements of the case (e.g., strength of 
the Crown’s case or criminal record of the accused) that we cannot observe in the 
data. At the same time, this relationship emerges across cities and type of offence.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief literature review on 
studies of case adjudication. Part II presents our empirical framework, describing 
our identification and empirical strategies. We briefly describe our data in Part III. 
Part IV provides our results, while Part V discusses implications of our findings 
and avenues for future research. Part VI concludes.
6. See e.g. Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lorne Sossin, eds, Middle Income Access to 
Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). For a general discussion of access to 
justice challenges, see Pascoe Pleasence et al, Causes of Action: Civil Law and Social Justice 
(Norwich, UK: Legal Services Commission, 2004).
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I. RELEVANT LITERATURE ON CASE ADJUDICATION 
In recent years, legal scholars have become interested in examining case 
adjudication and its institutional elements. Generally speaking, scholars have 
examined judges and individual litigants, both from an empirical and theoretical 
perspective. In the criminal context, scholarship has pursued separate inquires of 
the prosecution, judges, and the defence. 
The existing literature shows that prosecutors, like private lawyers in a firm, 
operate in a competitive market. Because prosecutors have wide discretion in 
choosing which cases to bring forth, conviction rates are uniformly high,7 with 
prosecutors having “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other 
person … .”8 They differentiate themselves, however, by the length of sentence 
they secure in their conviction, which positively influences their chances for 
promotion.9 This inherent discretion, however, poses the risk of prosecutorial 
overreach, which is difficult to monitor.10
Scholarship on judicial behaviour has primarily examined the extent to 
which judges are ideological in how they decide cases. The existing literature 
in the American context reveals that federal judges are ideologically consistent 
in how they decide cases, and their decision making is strongly correlated with 
the elected official who appointed them to the bench.11 Where judges are elected 
rather than appointed, judges are particularly attentive to the political will of 
their constituents.12
The study of legal representation, broadly speaking, examines three 
related questions. The first looks at the returns to having legal representation. 
In a study examining low-income tenants facing eviction, scholars found that 
7. See Eric Rasmusen, Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, “Convictions versus Conviction Rates: 
The Prosecutor’s Choice” (2009) 11:1 Am L & Econ Rev 47.
8. Brian Forst & Kathleen B Brosi, “A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor” 
(1977) 6:1 J Leg Stud 177 at 177.
9. See Richard T Boylan, “What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. 
Attorneys” (2005) 7:2 Am L & Econ Rev 379.
10. See Rachel E Barkow, “Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law” (2009) 61:4 Stan L Rev 869.
11. See Cass R Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J 
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).
12. See Paul Brace & Brent D Boyea, “State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice 
of Electing Judges” (2008) 52:2 Am J Pol Sci 360.
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tenants fared much better with a lawyer than without,13 a finding buttressed by 
random assignment of lawyers to tenants. For the class of litigants with legal 
representation, quality also matters. In a given office of public defenders where 
cases were randomly assigned, clear differences emerged between the highest decile 
and lowest decile performing lawyers. Defendants represented by the former were 
much less likely to be convicted and served considerably shorter sentences.14
The second question examines differences within classes of lawyers. A recent 
study of criminal trials found that judges and opposing attorneys’ perception of 
attorney skill had no effect on trial outcome.15 Jurors’ perception of opposing 
counsel mattered for prosecutors, but not defendants, leading the author to 
conclude that “the skill level of the defense attorney plays no role in determining 
the outcome of a criminal trial in everyday cases … .”16 In contrast, a broader 
study of state and federal judges that considered all litigation, not merely trials, 
found that judges perceived disparities in the quality of legal representation, both 
within and across areas of law. In criminal cases, judges perceived significant 
disparities in 20% to 40% of cases;17 in civil cases, the disparities varied by 
area of law, with civil rights litigation providing the most frequent occurrences 
and intellectual property providing the least.18 In light of these disparities, the 
majority of judges at the trial and appellate levels compensate for the perceived 
weaker attorney by engaging in additional legal research.19
The third question looks beyond the threshold questions of the returns to 
legal representation and attorney representation, examining different types of 
lawyers providing the same service. A recent study showed private attorneys 
and public defenders achieving similar conviction and sentencing outcomes for 
the defendant clients, but assigned counsel achieving less favourable outcomes 
13. See Carroll Seron et al, “The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City’s Housing Courts: Results of a Randomized Experiment” (2001) 35:2 Law 
& Soc’y Rev 419.
14. See David S Abrams & Albert H Yoon, “The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case 
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability” (2007) 74:4 U Chicago L Rev 1145.
15. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, “Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on 
Trial Outcomes” (2010) 63:1 Va L Rev 267.
16. Ibid at 291 [emphasis in original].
17. See Richard A Posner & Albert H Yoon, “What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal 
Representation” (2011) 63:2 Stan L Rev 317 at 327.
18. See ibid at 333.
19. See ibid at 336.
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than either.20 Other studies found that public defenders fare worse than private 
counsel.21 The limitation with direct comparisons between types of lawyers is 
selection effects, many of them unobservable, that affect not simply how cases 
resolve but the type of lawyer a litigant receives in the first place.
Scholars examining this question more systematically, by exploiting random 
assignment in particular offices, similarly have found clear differences across types 
of attorneys. A study of American federal criminal cases found that federal public 
defenders achieved lower incarceration rates and sentences than the alternative 
court-appointed attorneys.22 Another study looking at state criminal cases found 
that Philadelphia public defenders achieved more favourable outcomes than 
court-appointed counsel.23 
Comparing case outcomes across different delivery models differs from 
measuring attorney quality, in part because while the assignment of a case across 
types of attorneys (e.g., public defender versus court-appointed attorney) may 
be random, other aspects of these jobs are likely not. For example, significant 
structural differences exist between different types of criminal defence models. 
Public defender offices typically have more policies and procedures in place than 
court-appointed lawyers.24 Also, public defenders are typically salaried, while 
appointed counsel are typically paid hourly, per diem, or a flat rate.25 Criminal 
lawyers generally also face monetary constraints in which public funds are 
limited: The demands on one part of the system (e.g., prosecutors) inevitably 
affect resources available to represent indigent defendants. 
Equally important, legal systems vary across and even within jurisdictions. 
Correspondingly, courts differ along cultural dimensions of sociability and 
20. See Thomas H Cohen, “Who’s Better at Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense 
Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing Favorable Case Outcomes” (Government of the 
United States of America - Administrative Office of the US Courts Working Paper, 2011), 
online: <ssrn.com/abstract=1876474>. 
21. See Morris B Hoffman, Paul H Rubin & Joanna M Shepherd, “An Empirical Study of 
Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the ‘Marginally Indigent’” (2005) 3:1 Ohio 
St J Crim L 223.
22. See Radha Iyengar, “An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel” 
(2007) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 13187, online: <nber.org/
papers/w13187.pdf>.
23. See James M Anderson & Paul Heaton, “How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The 
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes” (2012) 122:1 Yale LJ 154.
24. See Jessa DeSimone, “Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender Act,” 
Legislative Comment, (2006) 96:4 J Crim L & Criminology 1479.
25. See Robert L Spangenberg & Marea L Beeman, “Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States” (1995) 58:1 Law & Contemp Probs 31 at 33-34.
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solidarity.26 Sociability refers to the affinity of individuals within an organization; 
solidarity refers to the ability of people to work together towards common goals. 
These differences, in turn, influence how courts handle cases; interact with 
administrators, prosecutors, and defence attorneys; and respond to change.27 
Scholars have found that timeliness and quality of case adjudication varies 
considerably across cities, in ways that trace back to differences in local legal 
culture,28 specifically in court efficiency, both with respect to time and quality.29 
Changing this culture requires greater awareness among the relevant actors, and 
addressing their concerns about the tradeoff between greater efficiency and case 
outcomes.30 While some scholars argue that different legal systems converge over 
time,31 local differences persist. 
Nearly all of the aforementioned studies have taken place in the United States. 
Canada shares many similarities with the United States with respect to its criminal 
justice system, but also some notable differences. For example, in the United 
States, most criminal cases are heard in state court, applying state law; federal 
criminal cases are limited to federal criminal offences. By contrast, criminal cases 
in Canada apply federal law, but are overwhelming heard in provincial court. 
In addition, Canada, like several commonwealth countries, consistently spends 
26. See Brian Ostrom et al, “Court Cultures and Their Consequences” (2005) 20:1 Ct Manager 
14 at 15-16 (decomposing court cultures along the dimensions of sociability and solidarity).
27. See ibid at 16 (describing how local legal cultures influence the processing and 
adjudication of cases).
28. For seminal work on local legal culture and its effect on court performance, see Teresa A 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbook, “The Persistence of Local Legal 
Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts” (1994) 17:3 Harv 
J L & Pub Pol’y 801; Thomas W Church Jr, “Examining Local Legal Culture” (1985) 10:3 
Am B Found Res J 449; Raymond T Nimmer, The Nature of System Change: Reform Impact 
in the Criminal Courts (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1978); National Center for State 
Courts, Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts, by Thomas Church Jr et 
al (Williamsburg, Va: National Center for State Courts, 1978). For an examination of local 
legal cultures in Europe, see James L Gibson & Gregory A Caldeira, “The Legal Cultures of 
Europe” (1996) 30:1 Law & Soc’y Rev 55.
29. See United States, National Center for State Courts and the American Prosecutors Research 
Institute, Efficiency, Timeliness, and Quality: A New Perspective from Nine State Criminal Trial 
Courts, by Brian J Ostrom & Roger A Hanson (Williamsburg, Va: National Center for State 
Courts, 1999); Peter F Nardulli, James Eisenstein & Roy B Flemming, The Tenor of Justice: 
Criminal Courts and the Guilty Plea Process (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1988) 
(similarly finding that criminal case outcomes depend considerably on local legal culture).
30. See James Peter Coolsen, “Case Management Innovation in a Large, Urban Trial Court: The 
Critical Importance of Legal Stakeholder Attitudes” (2009) 30:1 Just Sys J 70 at 83.
31. See Lawrence M Friedman, “Is There a Modern Legal Culture?” (1994) 7:2 Ratio Juris 117.
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more public money, per capita, on legal services than does the United States.32 To 
the best of our knowledge, no study exists in Canada that systematically analyzes 
case outcomes and the institutional factors that influence them. 
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: EXPLAINING UNEQUAL CASE 
OUTCOMES
In a first-best world, we could design an experiment to measure how different 
factors influence case outcomes. We could isolate factors one by one, holding 
other factors constant and randomizing the treatment of each factor. For example, 
we could randomize what type of legal representation (e.g., duty versus retained) 
the defendant received, or randomize the court (and judge) with jurisdiction over 
the case. This approach would allow us to confidently attribute differences in case 
outcomes to the treatment variable of interest.
Unfortunately, we do not live in this first-best world. While the judicial 
system employs elements of randomization—such as the mailing of jury 
questionnaires33—most aspects are not random. Defendants are assigned to courts 
in the jurisdiction where they were arrested. In Ontario, no rule requires that 
criminal cases be randomly assigned to judges, or that the Crown or Legal Aid 
Ontario attorneys randomly assign cases to their lawyers. Ontario also allocates 
its legal representation funding in part based on the seriousness of the offence.
Given these constraints, we adopt a more modest and incremental approach. 
We begin with the null hypothesis that criminal case outcomes are constant 
across the province, on the premise that all defendants are subject to the same 
laws and judicial system. This hypothesis is almost certainly false. Several factors 
could explain how case outcomes are inconsistent with the null hypothesis: 
differences in the (1) composition of defendants across court locations; (2) usage 
of types of defendants’ legal representation; (3) expenditures on defendants’ 
legal representation; or (4) practice norms of the police, Crown, and the 
judiciary, to name a few.
32. It is worth noting that Canada historically has spent over three times per capita on civil legal 
services than does the United States. See Justice Earl Johnson, Jr, “Equal Access to Justice: 
Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies” (2000) 
24:6 Fordham Int’l LJ S83 at S93-S94, Tables 1 and 2.
33. See Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “The Annual Jury Selection Process” 
(9 November 2015), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/jury/
jury_selection_process.asp>.
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If we observe differences in case outcomes, we then sequentially examine 
potential explanatory factors. Given the absence of a clear identification strategy, 
we look more closely at correlation among the given factors. Specifically, we 
are interested in whether variation in these factors across offences and court 
locations correlate with case outcomes. For example, do jurisdictions with 
higher incarceration rates have systematically higher crime incident ratios? Are 
defendants systematically older or younger in some jurisdictions than others? Do 
jurisdictions with higher jail sentences rely more or less on duty counsel?
Finally, because cross tabulations make only pairwise comparisons—not 
controlling for other factors—we regress case outcomes on these factors 
collectively, examining probability of a jail sentence, duration of a sentence, 
and amount of criminal fine. We chose these outcome measures because they 
represent, from the perspective of the defendant, the practical implications of 
their arrest: impositions on their time and finances.34 
We interpret these three outcome measures with caution, given likely 
selection on unobservables. The absence of random assignment means that 
factors unobservable in our empirical model—e.g., individual circumstances of 
defendants, or differences across courts in how judges decide similarly situated 
cases—may be influencing case outcomes. Nevertheless, the regression-adjusted 
models can support or challenge the relationships that emerge from the 
pairwise comparisons.
III. SOURCES OF DATA: THE ONTARIO COURTS AND LEGAL 
AID ONTARIO
Our data come primarily from two sources. The first is the Ontario courts. For the 
period 2007–2013, the Administration Division of the Ministry of the Attorney 
General provided us individual case level information on criminal cases for the 
following minor offences: theft or robbery (for amounts below $5000); impaired 
34. Our analysis omits whether the defendant’s charge resulted in a conviction. We would have 
liked to include this outcome, but our data do not allow us to know this with certainty. In 
our data, we do not directly observe whether the defendant was convicted, only whether 
they received any jail sentence or criminal fine. While a jail sentence or fine is a sufficient 
condition for a conviction, it is not a necessary one. A defendant could be convicted of an 
underlying offence but still avoid jail time (or a fine) at the discretion of the court.
TREBILCOCK, YOON,  EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW? 597
driving (i.e., DUI); common assault; and narcotics possession and trafficking.35 
These cases originate from the province’s Integrated Courts Offences Network 
(ICON), which tracks criminal charges filed at the Ontario Court of Justice. Cases 
involving juvenile defendants are excluded. Accordingly, we have the universe of 
cases involving the aforementioned offences that appear in provincial court.36 
Because police may arrest defendants for multiple offences stemming from 
the same arrest, a small subset of our data includes other offences (e.g., illegal 
possession of a firearm, resisting arrest) for which the defendant was concurrently 
charged. For completeness, we include multiple-offence cases in our analysis.
FIGURE 1: ONTARIO COURTS WITH JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES37
35. Specifically, we know the particular statutory violation alleged in the charge. Each of these 
offences encompasses more than one statute, but the vast majority of the offences that appear 
in our data arise from a single statute. For theft/robbery, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c 
C-46, s 334. For driving under the influence, see ibid, s 253. For common assault, see ibid, s 
266. For narcotics, see Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19, s 4.
36. ICON records whether a case was committed to Superior Court. In our data, this 
occurred only twice.
37. Map Data: © 2015 Google.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (2007–2013)
Cases Type of Offence (Fraction)
N 337035 Assault (CCC, s 266) 0.35
Theft/Robbery (CCC, s 334) 0.30
Defendant Demographics DUI (CCC, s 253) 0.15
Fraction Female 0.21 Narcotic Possession (CDSA, s 4) 0.20
Average Age 34.04 Narcotic Trafficking (CDSA, s 5) 0.05
   SD 12.42
Fraction Reporting Postal Code 0.25 Cases by Year (Fraction of Total Cases)
2007 0.14
Number of Charges 2008 0.14
Average 1.98 2009 0.14
   SD 2.19 2010 0.15
Median 1 2011 0.15
2012 0.15
Number of Court Appearances 2013 0.14
Average 4.30
   SD 16.46 Type of Legal Representation
Median 1 No Representation 0.09
Duty Counsel 0.38
Sentencing Retained Counsel 0.53
Fraction Serving Jail Sentence 0.20
Average Jail Sentence (months) 10.98 When Case Resolved
   SD 59.81 Before Trial 0.83
Median Jail Sentence (months) 0 At Trial 0.17
NOTES: The information was provided by Ontario courts for cases relating to assault, theft/
robbery, narcotic possession, DUI, and narcotics trafficking. Cases involving mulitple charges 
are categorized by the offence which receives the highest punishment, if any. The data excludes 
cases involving more serious offences that result in higher punishment than the aforementioned 
offences. Cases data refers to cases closed between the years 2007–2013. Retained Counsel 
under Type of Legal Representation refers both to certificate attorneys provided by LAO and 
private counsel.
CCC = Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46
CDSA = Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19
SD = Standard Deviation 
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The full data include cases from every court in the province with jurisdiction 
over these cases. This includes Brampton, Cornwall, Hamilton, Kenora, London, 
Oshawa, Ottawa, Peterborough, Sarnia, Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, 
and five Toronto courts (Old City Hall, 1911 Eglinton Avenue East, 1000 Finch 
Avenue West, 2201 Finch Avenue West, and College Park). Figure 1 shows the 
locations of these courts across the province. Most courts are situated around the 
Golden Horseshoe, where most of the province’s population resides. 
The Ontario Court of Justice gathers case data such that the unit of analysis is 
a defendant’s appearance before the court. Because our focus is on case outcomes, 
we transpose the data into a flat file, where the unit of observation is now a single 
case that captures the different charges (if multiple), the number of appearances, 
and the resulting fine and jail sentences, if any.38 Each observation includes the 
start and end date of the case; the alleged offence; the type of legal representation, 
if any, a defendant receives; and any jail sentence and/or fine.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the Ontario court data, which represent 
all case filings, irrespective of outcome. We comment on a few notable numbers. 
The average age of defendants is 34 years, with males comprising the majority 
at nearly 80%. Most defendants face a single charge. One fifth of defendants 
receive a jail sentence, a perhaps unsurprising fraction given the relatively minor 
nature of these offences.39 The average jail sentence across all cases was 10.98 
months. Within this set of offences, the most common offence is assault (35%), 
followed closely by theft/robbery (30%). Narcotic possession (20%) and DUI 
(15%) appear roughly half as often as assault and theft/robbery, and narcotic 
trafficking is even less common (5%). 
With respect to legal representation, most defendants (53%) receive 
representation by retained counsel, which may come in the form of private or 
certificate (LAO) counsel. Duty counsel represents another 38% of defendants, 
with 9% of defendants proceeding without legal representation. These figures, 
as we discuss in Table 5 in Part IV(D), below, obscure LAO’s central role in 
representing indigent criminal defendants in Ontario, as LAO employs or finances 
all duty counsel and the vast majority of private counsel in these criminal matters. 
Finally, the summary statistics confirm that most criminal cases in Ontario 
(83%) resolve through pre-trial plea-bargaining. The remaining fraction (17%) 
38. In a small number of cases, the defendant’s type of legal representation may change during 
the course of his or her case. These changes, when they occur, typically occur early in the 
case. When creating the flat file, we record the final type of legal representation.
39. We do not directly observe whether the defendant’s case resulted in a conviction, only 
whether a jail sentence or criminal fine was received. See supra note 34. 
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resolves at trial. This latter figure at first appears high, given that other countries 
report lower fractions of criminal cases adjudicated at trial.40 The term at trial 
simply means that the case resolved after the trial began, whether by plea 
agreement or court verdict.
Our second source of data is LAO. Unlike the Ontario court data, which 
is individual case level information, LAO provided us aggregate case statistics 
for the set of offences listed in Table 1.41 For cases involving duty counsel—
staff and per diem—LAO provided total caseload and expenditures by year 
and court location. For cases involving lawyers retained through the certificate 
program, LAO provided total caseload and expenditures for year, court location, 
as well as type of offence. We calculated the average expenditure for year and 
court for duty counsel, and average expenditure for year, court, and offence for 
certificate lawyers. 
TABLE 2: CASE OUTCOMES—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
N 337035 27094 12299 26585 23597 19918 133373
Duration of Case
All Offences 198 214 212 145 184 174 206
    SD 298 373 394 222 254 253 294
Assault 207 220 199 145 171 152 234
    SD 239 305 300 175 199 185 240
Theft/Robbery 140 188 225 132 131 163 123
    SD 327 464 447 258 268 338 308
DUI 289 259 184 169 283 194 366
    SD 329 315 318 226 311 239 319
Narcotics 
Possession 189 185 242 152 159 193 198
    SD 287 304 540 202 202 261 293
40. See Stephanos Bibas, “Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing” (2005) 58:1 Stan L 
Rev 137 at 145 (stating that 95% of federal criminal cases resolve through plea-bargaining).
41. One key difference is that LAO was not able to provide separate statistics for narcotic 
possession and narcotic trafficking, but simply combined this category.
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TABLE 2: CASE OUTCOMES—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
Narcotics 
Trafficking 275 301 252 233 244 276 287
    SD 265 373 394 195 230 241 271
Fraction Adjudicated by or during trial
All Offences 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.18
Fraction Jailed
All Offences 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.19
Assault 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.20
Theft/Robbery 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.35 0.17 0.40 0.27
DUI 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08
Narcotics 
Possession 0.16 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.29 0.14
Narcotics 
Trafficking 0.24 0.33 0.22 0.34 0.28 0.37 0.21
Incarceration (days)
All Offences 11 15 12 17 10 18 9
    SD 60 72 53 57 62 63 61
Assault 11 17 13 15 10 19 9
    SD 51 64 39 53 52 52 54
Theft/Robbery 12 17 15 22 11 26 9
    SD 53 62 62 58 71 74 47
DUI 7 7 6 7 9 8 4
    SD 47 49 26 43 63 48 35
Narcotics 
Possession 13 21 11 17 10 20 12
    SD 84 111 82 65 66 77 97
Narcotics 
Trafficking 40 76 43 44 45 57 33
    SD 165 235 169 127 136 152 176
NOTES: The information was provided by Ontario courts for cases relating to assault, theft, 
narcotic possession, DUI, and narcotics trafficking. Cases involving mulitple charges are 
categorized by the offence which receives the highest punishment, if any. The data excludes cases 
involving more serious offences that result in higher punishment than aforementioned offences. 
Cases data refers to cases closed between the years 2007–2013. 
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IV. FINDINGS: OUTCOMES VARY PRIMARILY WITH LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION 
In the following tables, we present analysis for Ontario as a whole, as well as for 
a subset of its larger cities. We chose these cities for the simple reason that they 
represented the largest criminal case docket for our sample of cases.
A. CASE OUTCOMES
Case outcomes, as shown in Table 2, vary considerably by offence and city. For 
example, across the province, the judicial system processes theft/robbery cases on 
average 140 days faster 
than other offences (e.g.,289 days for DUI). Correspondingly, the fraction 
jailed is higher for theft/robbery (26%) than for DUI (10%), and the average jail 
sentence follows a similar ratio. Across the province, cases process in roughly 200 
days on average across all offences, but process roughly 30% faster in London 
(145 days) than they do in Toronto (206 days). At the same time, defendants 
charged in London, Ottawa, and Hamilton are 40% more likely to receive a 
jail sentence than defendants in Toronto or Thunder Bay. Moreover, London 
defendants receive longer average jail sentences than Toronto defendants 
across every offence.
While some trends emerge across offences and cities, patterns do not 
necessarily correlate across measures of case outcomes. For example, across the 
province, defendants are more likely to receive a jail sentence for theft/robbery 
(26%) than other offences (10%), suggesting that defendants are more likely to 
accept a plea sentence when facing a theft/robbery charge. Given the relative 
alacrity with which the province adjudicates theft/robbery cases, this jail sentence 
(12 days) is nevertheless comparable to assault (11 days), while shorter than 
narcotic possession or trafficking (13 and 40 days, respectively).
B. DEFENDANT DEMOGRAPHICS
The composition of defendants also varies by type of offence and city, although 
their demographic differences appear to be smaller than the differences in case 
outcomes. Table 3 suggests that the observed differences in defendants’ age and 
gender do not strongly correlate with the general patterns we observe in case 
outcomes (Table 2). The variation in age across offences, using median or mean, 
is relatively narrow. London, in particular, routinely falls close to the provincial 
average with respect to defendant characteristics. Nevertheless, jail sentences in 
London (Table 2) are higher than the provincial average in most instances. This 
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lack of a clear relationship between defendant characteristics and case outcomes 
leaves open the possibility that other characteristics more strongly influence 
case outcomes. 
TABLE 3: DEFENDANT DEMOGRAPHICS—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
N 337035 27094 12299 26585 23597 19918 133373
Age
All offences
  Median 32 33 30 30 31 32 33
  Mean 34.0 34.6 33.1 33.1 33.4 34.3 34.7
    SD 12.4 12.2 12.3 12.1 12.6 12.2 12.4
Assault
  Median 32 32 31 31 33 33 33
  Mean 34.2 33.8 33.1 33.0 34.5 34.3 34.9
    SD 12.0 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.9 11.7 12.2
Theft/Robbery
  Median 33 36 29 30 32 34 35
  Mean 34.9 36.0 31.6 33.0 33.9 35.2 36.1
    SD 12.8 12.2 11.4 12.1 13.1 12.4 12.8
DUI
  Median 35 33 34 35 36 38 34
  Mean 37.0 36.0 36.8 36.8 37.3 38.3 36.7
    SD 13.0 13.2 14.1 13.4 13.1 13.3 12.4
Narcotics Possession
  Median 26 27 28 28 24 28 27
  Mean 29.7 30.6 31.5 30.9 28.1 31.2 30.0
    SD 10.8 10.9 11.8 10.8 10.3 10.9 10.7
Narcotics Trafficking
  Median 27 26 32 28 27 28 27
  Mean 30.5 30.4 34.5 31.9 30.4 30.5 30.0
    SD 11.0 10.9 12.2 11.8 10.9 10.2 10.7
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TABLE 3: DEFENDANT DEMOGRAPHICS—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Gender (fraction female)
All offences 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.21
Assault 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.16
Theft/Robbery 0.35 0.26 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.29 0.34
DUI 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13
Narcotics Possession 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.11
Narcotics Trafficking 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.13
NOTES: The information was provided by Ontario courts for cases relating to assault, theft, 
narcotic possession, DUI, and narcotics trafficking. Cases involving mulitple charges are 
categorized by the offence which receives the highest punishment, if any. The data excludes 
cases involving more serious offences that result in higher punishment than the aforementioned 
offences. Cases data refers to cases closed between the years 2007–2013. 
Comment
1. Not that much variation within courts for the same offense
2. Some variation across offenses for the same court.
C. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS
As with the defendant demographics (Table 3), population demographics (Table 
4) do not correlate closely with the case outcomes (Table 2). For example, 
London—which in Table 2 reports higher incarceration rates and sentencing 
than other cities—has the lowest median income among the cities listed, while 
having one of the highest unemployment rates. Its overall crime severity index, 
while close to the provincial average, is higher than the other cities. At the same 
time, London’s crime severity indices, including separate measures for violent 
and non-violent offences, is lower than Thunder Bay’s indices. But Thunder Bay 
reports lower incarceration and sentence length than London (Table 2).
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TABLE 4: CENSUS DATA—SELECT CITIES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
N 337035 27094 12299 26585 23597 19918 133373
Age
All offences
  Median 32 33 30 30 31 32 33
  Mean 34.0 34.6 33.1 33.1 33.4 34.3 34.7
2011 Population 12,851,821 1,236,324 108,359 366,151 149,607 721,053 5,583,064
Population Demographics (2011)
Median Age 40 39 43 39 41 41 39
Median Income $30,526 $38,543 $31,182 $29,478 $34,816 $32,008 $29,593
Unemployment 
Rate 8.30 6.60 8.00 9.00 8.90 10.10 8.60
Crime Severity Index (2012)
All Offences 77.6 57.0 88.0 74.5 47.5 60.1 52.1
Violent Offences 85.7 58.2 118.8 64.1 54.3 62.5 78.4
Non-Violent 
Offences 74.5 56.5 76.5 78.1 44.9 59.1 42.5
SOURCES: Data on population comes form Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household 
Survey (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2013). Data on the Crime Severity Index comes from 
Statistics Canada, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2012” by Samuel Perreault, 
in Juristat, Catalogue NO 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2013) at 32 (Table 4), 
with the exception of Oshawa, which comes from Statistics Canada, “Crime Severity Index 
values for 239 police services policing communities over 10,000 population, 2011” (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, 2012).
D. LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Our data allow us to examine the type of legal representation, which varies 
considerably across the province. Table 5 reports that in the aggregate, over 90% 
of defendants receive legal representation, either in the form of duty counsel or 
retained counsel. These categories are more nuanced than they first appear, as 
both types of representation capture multiple subcategories of counsel. Within 
duty counsel, that representation can take the form of salaried or per diem, both 
of which the LAO funds. Both types provide legal advice to defendants, and can 
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appear in court with the defendant on matters of bail, pleas, and sentencing—
but typically not trials.42
TABLE 5: DEFENDANT’S LEGAL REPRESENTATION—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
N 337035 27094 12299 26585 23597 19918 133373
Chosen Representation
All Offences
   No Legal 
Representation 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04
   Duty Counsel 0.38 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.57
   Retained Counsel 0.53 0.72 0.56 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.40
Assault
   No Legal 
Representation 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.05
   Duty Counsel 0.33 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.47
   Retained Counsel 0.60 0.76 0.66 0.73 0.64 0.73 0.48
Theft/Robbery
   No Legal 
Representation 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.04
   Duty Counsel 0.50 0.28 0.22 0.30 0.36 0.28 0.70
   Retained Counsel 0.38 0.61 0.50 0.58 0.40 0.58 0.25
DUI
   No Legal 
Representation 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.03
   Duty Counsel 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.39
   Retained Counsel 0.69 0.84 0.57 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.58
Narcotics Possession
   No Legal 
Representation 0.11 0.09 0.39 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.02
   Duty Counsel 0.39 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.30 0.20 0.61
   Retained Counsel 0.50 0.70 0.41 0.72 0.48 0.65 0.38
42. See Legal Aid Ontario, “Criminal duty counsel” (2015), online: <www.legalaid.on.ca/en/
getting/dutycounsel_criminal.asp>.
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TABLE 5: DEFENDANT’S LEGAL REPRESENTATION—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Narcotics Trafficking
   No Legal 
Representation 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01
   Duty Counsel 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.38
   Retained Counsel 0.75 0.88 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.95 0.60
NOTES: The information was provided by Ontario courts for cases relating to assault, theft, 
narcotic possession, DUI, and narcotics trafficking. Cases involving mulitple charges are 
categorized by the offence which receives the highest punishment, if any. The data excludes cases 
involving more serious offences that result in higher punishment than aforementioned offences. 
The data refers to cases closed between the years 2007–2013. Retained Counsel under Chosen 
Representation refers both to certificate attorneys provided by LAO and private counsel.
Comment
1. Variation across courts for same offense
2. Variation across courts for different offenses
Table 4 suggests that some of the observed differences in case outcomes may 
be attributable to differences in socioeconomic factors across the cities. Drawing 
from information from Statistics Canada, Table 4 reports demographic and 
socioeconomic data from 2011 and crime data for 2012. The cities’ variation in 
age is relatively narrow. The cities’ statistics for income and unemployment show 
greater variation. For example, Ottawa has the highest median income and lowest 
unemployment, while London has the lowest median income and Hamilton the 
highest unemployment. With respect to the crime indices, the correlation between 
median income and unemployment rate appears attenuated. As mentioned, 
Ottawa has the highest median income and the lowest unemployment rate, but 
cities such as Oshawa and Hamilton have both a higher median income and 
unemployment rate than the provincial average.
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TABLE 6: LAO LEGAL REPRESENTATION—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
N 337035 27094 12299 26585 23597 19918 133373
Chosen Representation
All Offences
   No Legal 
Representation 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04
   Duty Counsel 0.38 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.57
Duty Counsel
Per Diem
   Expenditure per 
Case $63 $120 $94 $65 $74 $52 $56
    N 550,599 6,203 19,436 52,332 27,326 76,410 171,606
  Staff
   Expenditure per 
Case $71 $58 $72 $86 $52 $90 $83
    N 876,639 73,280 9,628 20,896 66,415 8,443 504,618
Certificate
All Cases $1,562 $1,624 $970 $1,196 $1,509 $1,459 $1,850
    N 115,062 13,892 3,807 11,885 4,162 15,594 41,959
  Assault $1,277 $1,503 $908 $1,124 $1,321 $1,211 $1,354
    N 43,305 4,483 1,961 3,870 1,381 5,683 16,318
  Theft/Robbery $1,512 $1,503 $927 $1,110 $1,412 $1,499 $1,805
    N 36,649 5,126 1,126 4,590 1,274 5,008 13,074
  DUI $1,169 $1,163 $845 $1,183 $1,040 $1,147 $1,366
    N 3,218 473 139 256 168 365 686
  Narcotics $2,048 $1,985 $1,294 $1,410 $1,854 $1,749 $2,609
    N 31,890 3,810 581 3,169 1,339 4,538 11,881
NOTES: The data was provided by LAO for cases covering the period 2007–2013. Dollar 
amounts are reported in constant 2013 dollars. Figures for the province (Column 1) include 
cities beyond those listed in Columns 2-6, and accordingly is greater than the sum for these 
columns. Data for Duty Counsel—per diem and staff—are not broken down by type of case. 
Data for Certificate cases are broken down by case; if cases involve multiple different offences, 
the offence of record is determined by the most serious charged offence.
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Retained counsel includes both certificate and privately retained counsel. 
In either instance, private lawyers represent defendants. The difference within 
retained counsel is the source of funding: LAO pays for certificate counsel, while 
the defendants pay out of pocket for non-certificate private retained counsel. 
In determining whether a legal matter qualifies for a certificate, LAO considers 
the defendant’s financial eligibility, as well as whether the defendant faces likely 
imprisonment if convicted.43 As a general matter, LAO certificate representation 
are reserved for more serious and complex criminal matters. 
The largest source of variation is the relative balance between duty and 
retained counsel. Defendants are more likely to be represented by duty counsel 
when charged with theft/robbery, and less likely when charged with narcotics 
trafficking. The severity of punishment cannot readily explain this trend. For 
example, defendants charged with narcotics trafficking—statistically regarded as 
more serious than narcotics possession based on sentencing (Table 2)—are more 
likely to choose retained counsel. At the same time, the majority of defendants 
charged with DUI—which, as a stand-alone offence not involving homicide or 
other bodily injury, has the lowest probability of incarceration and jail sentence 
(Table 2)—opt for retained counsel.
Cities also vary in their use of different legal representation. For example, 
defendants in Toronto are least likely to proceed without legal representation, 
and most likely to rely on duty counsel. By contrast, defendants in Ottawa rely 
on retained counsel more than defendants in the other listed cities, save for 
narcotics offences.
Decomposing legal representation into its elemental types, by itself, tells 
an incomplete story, failing to account for potential differences in expenditures 
across these types. Table 6 shows that LAO spends much more on average for cases 
represented by certificate counsel than for duty counsel: The average expenditure 
for the former exceeds $1000 for every type of offence, while averaging less than 
$100 for both staff and per diem.44 This difference in expenditure between the 
two types of counsel is consistent with the view that certificate counsel works 
on more complex cases, thereby generating higher legal costs. Over 90% of cases 
involving LAO are funded through duty counsel, although LAO allocates over 
43. For a discussion of certificate eligibility, see Legal Aid Ontario, “I’ve been charged with a 
crime… do I qualify for legal aid services?” (2015), online: <www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/
eligibility_charges.asp>. On its website, LAO provides a “Criminal Code charge search” 
that describes general guidelines for whether LAO provides a certificate for a given offence 
[LAO Eligibility]. 
44. LAO maintains expenditures by offence for certificate, but not duty, counsel.
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two-thirds of its lawyer expenditures through certificate counsel. With respect to 
certificate counsel, cities vary in their expenditures. Toronto spends the most per 
case among the selected cities for most offences (save assault), while Thunder Bay 
spends the least in every offence category. 
While the criteria by which LAO decides whether to provide certificate 
counsel depends on the specifics of each case,45 LAO’s use of certificate counsel 
appears to comprise the majority of retained counsel. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations comparing the number of cases of retained counsel in Table 5 
(roughly 180,000) with the number of certificate cases provided by LAO in Table 
6 (roughly 115,000) suggest that LAO finances well over three-fifths (64%) of 
defendants using retaining counsel.46
TABLE 7: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female -0.109*** -0.134*** -0.0831*** -0.132*** -0.0754*** -0.105*** -0.119***
(0.00129) (0.00563) (0.00678) (0.00567) (0.00413) (0.00717) (0.00202)
Age
    21-25 0.0586*** 0.0933*** 0.0566*** 0.0972*** 0.0428*** 0.0519*** 0.0548***
(0.00291) (0.0125) (0.0140) (0.0109) (0.00882) (0.0134) (0.00495)
    26-30 0.110*** 0.196*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.0805*** 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.00329) (0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0146) (0.00553)
    31-40 0.126*** 0.232*** 0.0708*** 0.119*** 0.0862*** 0.129*** 0.141***
(0.00297) (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0108) (0.00945) (0.0134) (0.00504)
    41-50 0.133*** 0.239*** 0.0868*** 0.0764*** 0.0954*** 0.142*** 0.155***
(0.00317) (0.0127) (0.0156) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0140) (0.00534)
    50+ 0.0587*** 0.123*** 0.0132 -0.0384*** 0.0549*** 0.0888*** 0.0784***
(0.00346) (0.0148) (0.0164) (0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0164) (0.00575)
45. See LAO Eligibility, supra note 43.
46. The case numbers do not track identically between the LAO and the Ontario court data. 
LAO reports expenditures on a yearly basis, while the Ontario courts report representation 
based on filing or closing dates.
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TABLE 7: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
-0.123*** -0.0125 -0.0229 -0.256*** -0.0782*** -0.211*** -0.0358***
(0.00236) (0.0236) (0.0191) (0.0116) (0.00943) (0.0155) (0.00730)
Duty Counsel -0.0781*** 0.0874*** -0.0922*** -0.218*** -0.0376*** -0.0836*** -0.0119*
(0.00368) (0.0248) (0.0141) (0.0219) (0.0119) (0.0251) (0.00666)
Legal 
Expenditures
-0.000355*** 0.000245* 0.000575*** -0.000748** 0.000110 0.000727*** -0.000122***
    (in $10s) (2.58e-05) (0.000143) (0.000186) (0.000293) (8.90e-05) (0.000196) (3.85e-05)
Observations 337,035 27,095 12,299 26,585 23,597 19,917 133,378
NOTES: The dependent variable is whether the defendant received a jail sentence. Coefficients 
are reported as marginal effects, and standard errors are indicated in parentheses. For Age, 
the omitted baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the 
omitted baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both 
salaried and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. 
Legal expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which the case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
E. LIKELIHOOD OF SENTENCE
The examination of individual factors, while informative, ignores their interaction 
with other factors. For example, any correlation of age with case outcomes 
may change if these factors are correlated with other demographic factors or 
the form of legal representation. Accordingly, we regress case outcomes on the 
aforementioned defendant and case characteristics, as well as other observable 
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case and defendant characteristics.47 In the Tables that follow, we report on the 
entire set of cases, not merely the cases in which the defendant was convicted or 
received a jail sentence. Our rationale is to capture the full set of outcomes, which 
implicitly reflect actions of the Crown, judges, and lawyers.
Table 7 reports whether a defendant received a jail sentence, controlling for 
year, type of offence, number of charges, and number of court appearances. The 
dependent variable is the dichotomous outcome whether the defendant received 
a jail sentence, and the coefficients are reported as probit marginal effects. A 
defendant’s demographic characteristics correlate strongly with the outcome: 
Women across the province are 10% less likely to receive a jail sentence than men 
(Column 1), with the greatest disparity in Ottawa and the smallest in Oshawa. 
Similarly, across all jurisdictions, older defendants are more likely to receive a jail 
sentence than the baseline (omitted) group of defendants 20 years and younger. 
In most cities, the probability of a sentence monotonically increases by age 
cohort until the defendant reaches 50 years. The exceptions are Thunder Bay and 
London, where defendants aged 26 to 30 are most likely to receive a jail sentence.
Similarly, the type of legal representation a defendant receives correlates 
strongly with the likelihood of receiving a jail sentence. Compared with the baseline 
(omitted) category of defendants with retained counsel, defendants without legal 
representation are less likely to receive a jail sentence. This disparity reflects the 
fact that the Crown drops all charges for a significant fraction of unrepresented 
defendants: The underlying data reveal that only 9% of unrepresented defendants 
receive a jail sentence, compared with 21% of represented defendants.
As between duty and retained counsel, cities vary considerably in the 
probabilities of the defendant receiving a jail sentence. Overall, and in most 
cities, defendants represented by retained counsel are more likely to receive a 
jail sentence than those represented by duty counsel. This difference comports 
with certificate counsel typically dealing with more serious or complex cases. Yet, 
in Ottawa and Thunder Bay, the pattern is reversed: Defendants with retained 
counsel are less likely to receive a jail sentence.
The empirical specifications in Table 7 controls for expenditures at the 
city-year-lawyer level, which has a statistically significant effect on the defendant’s 
probability of receiving a jail sentence. The point estimates for duty and retained 
counsel are sensitive to the inclusion of legal expenditures. Overall, their effect 
47. For defendant characteristics, we include a series of dummies for the cohort age of the 
defendant. This approach allows for a flexible, non-linear relationship between age and case 
outcome. With respect to legal expenditures, we elect a linear relationship because we know 
only city-year averages for LAO expenditures for duty counsel and certificate counsel. 
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on the point estimates for duty counsel is small, but greater for retained counsel. 
In a separate regression excluding lawyer expenditures (not reported), defendants 
with retained counsel have a 13% higher probability of receiving a jail sentence 
than defendants without representation. Controlling for lawyer expenditures, 
Table 7 (Column 1) shows that defendants with duty counsel have an 8% lower 
probability of a jail sentence than defendants represented by retained counsel. 
This difference in point estimates reinforces a likely selection effect, where 
retained counsel disproportionately handles cases where the defendant faces a 
likelihood of a jail sentence. This effect, however, varies by city. Controlling for 
expenditure reveals that retained counsel correspond with a greater probability of 
a jail sentence in each of the listed cities.
It is worth noting that in presenting separate specifications for the individual 
cities, we are not claiming that case outcomes are statistically different across each 
of these cities (although they are in many instances). Rather, we emphasize that 
differences emerge across cities along specific factors, such as gender.
TABLE 8: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.289*** 0.323*** 0.333*** 0.386*** 0.327*** 0.429*** 0.272***
(-41.56) (-14.83) (-12.13) (-14.96) (-9.96) (-10.23) (-24.13)
Age
    21-25 1.693*** 2.222*** 2.436*** 1.694*** 1.428* 1.304 1.630***
(10.45) (6.93) (6.13) (6.40) (2.19) (1.80) (4.71)
    26-30 2.359*** 2.991*** 3.472*** 2.025*** 2.041*** 1.494** 2.411***
(18.06) (10.74) (9.28) (8.59) (4.20) (3.09) (9.35)
    31-40 2.586*** 3.817*** 3.132*** 1.662*** 2.557*** 1.784*** 2.721***
(21.24) (13.99) (8.47) (6.74) (5.85) (4.51) (11.40)
    41-50 2.854*** 4.155*** 3.838*** 1.716*** 3.380*** 1.991*** 2.813***
(21.42) (14.39) (9.15) (5.50) (7.26) (5.24) (11.52)
    50+ 2.012*** 3.010*** 2.588*** 0.941 1.975*** 1.789*** 2.136***
(11.62) (7.79) (4.44) (-0.53) (3.74) (3.84) (6.83)
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TABLE 8: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
0.344*** 1.112 1.070 0.230*** 0.525** 0.302*** 0.723*
(-14.20) (0.48) (0.31) (-4.39) (-2.58) (-3.92) (-2.20)
Duty Counsel 0.649*** 1.988*** 0.484** 0.411** 0.924 0.779 0.981
(-6.11) (3.38) (-2.99) (-2.83) (-0.34) (-0.96) (-0.15)
Legal 
Expenditures
1.000 1.004** 1.010*** 1.001 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.001
    (in $10s) (0.54) (3.23) (4.44) (0.21) (4.35) (4.14) (1.54)
Observations 337035 27095 12299 26585 23597 19917 133378
NOTES: The dependent variable is the length of the defendant’s jail sententce, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
The effect of defendant characteristics and legal representation holds when 
examining individual offences. Tables A1 and A2, reported in the Appendix, 
look at the individual offences of theft/robbery and DUI, respectively. For theft/
robbery, the results were similar to Table 7: Women are less likely to receive a jail 
sentence, as are defendants under age 21; defendants represented by duty counsel 
are less likely to receive a jail sentence than defendants represented by retained 
counsel (again reflecting likely selection effects). 
For DUI offences, the effect of gender was smaller across the province and 
each city, although still statistically significant. With respect to age, some cities—
specifically London and Toronto—did not meaningfully differentiate between 
the under-21 and the 21–25 cohorts, although older cohorts were more likely to 
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receive a jail sentence. The type of legal representation mattered less than for theft/
robbery, and in many instances was not statistically significant.48 Taken together, 
Tables A1 and A2 reflect the fact that a defendant’s form of legal representation 
correlates more closely for theft/robbery than for DUI.
F. DURATION OF SENTENCE
Table 8 examines the length of the sentence itself, based on the same factors in 
Table 7, using a negative binomial model. We chose this model for two reasons. 
First, sentence length is a form of count data, truncated at zero, for which ordinary 
least squares is inappropriate. Second, sentence length follows a non-normal 
distribution, where the variance is greater than the mean. We report the variable 
coefficients in Table 7 as incident rate ratios, the log of the ratio of expected 
counts. More simply stated, the coefficients report the variables’ one-unit effect 
on the sentence rate.49
As with the probability of receiving a jail sentence, women fared better than 
men, as did defendants in the under-21 cohort. Across the province, the sentence 
length for female defendants was 29% that of male defendants, while defendants 
under age 21 served the shortest sentences of all age cohorts. The differences 
in sentence length, however, vary considerably by city. Toronto has the largest 
disparity in sentence length based on gender, while Thunder Bay imposes higher 
sentence lengths for older defendant cohorts. 
The effect of legal representation on sentence length suggests a more 
nuanced story. Across the province, defendants represented by duty counsel 
received shorter sentences than defendants represented by retained counsel. 
But in individual cities, such as Ottawa, the reverse pattern emerged. Oshawa, 
Hamilton, and Toronto are notable because the differences in outcomes between 
48. Defendants represented by duty counsel and retained counsel were more likely on average to 
receive a jail sentence than defendants representing themselves, but the disparity was smaller, 
and in Thunder Bay, defendants represented by duty counsel were 3% less likely to receive a 
jail sentence than defendants representing themselves.
49. Notwithstanding the high fraction of zero-value observations, we decided against using a 
zero-inflated regression model (e.g., either Poisson or negative binomial) because it assumes 
that the zeros are composed of true (counts generated by the standard Poisson regression 
model) and excess (counts with a zero probability of a count greater than zero). Our data do 
not support this assumption for either sentence length or fine amount. For a discussion on 
zero-inflated regression models, see William Greene, Functional Form and Heterogeneity in 
Models for Count Data (New York: Now, 2007) at 31-36.
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defendants represented by duty counsel and retained counsel were small and 
statistically non-significant.
Examining sentence length for individual offences—theft/robbery and DUI 
(Table A3 and Table A4, respectively, in the Appendix, below)—tells a similar 
story to the full sample of offences in Table 8. The disparities by gender and legal 
representation are larger for theft/robbery than for DUI. Across the province, 
female defendants serve 20% of the sentence length of male defendants across 
the province, but 27% of the comparable sentence length for DUI. Compared 
to defendants represented by retained counsel, defendants represented by duty 
counsel serve only 21% of the sentence length for theft-robbery, and 66% of the 
sentence length for DUI. It is worth noting that for most cities, the differences in 
outcomes comparing duty and retained counsel were not statistically significant.
For completeness, we also examine criminal fines. For the same reasons as 
with sentence length (Table 8), we use a negative binomial regression. As a formal 
matter, fines can be imposed irrespective of whether the defendant receives a jail 
sentence. As a practical matter, however, fines and jail sentences rarely overlapped. 
Most defendants (67%) received neither a jail sentence nor a fine. Roughly one 
fifth (19%) received only a jail sentence, and 13% received only a fine. In only 
0.3% of the cases did a defendant receive both a sentence and a fine. To frame 
it slightly differently, conditioned on receiving a jail sentence, a defendant also 
received a fine in only 2% of cases. 
TABLE 9: CRIMINAL FINES—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.332*** 0.411*** 0.303*** 0.387*** 0.339*** 0.260*** 0.233***
(-21.38) (-7.63) (-7.82) (-9.80) (-9.03) (-10.31) (-12.58)
Age
    21-25 1.653*** 1.152 1.598* 1.569** 1.343 2.727*** 1.552
(6.35) (0.61) (2.34) (3.07) (1.61) (4.88) (1.74)
    26-30 1.977*** 1.175 2.699*** 1.697*** 1.203 2.803*** 2.131**
(6.82) (0.68) (4.68) (3.77) (1.04) (4.80) (2.76)
    31-40 1.984*** 1.169 2.712*** 1.941*** 1.308 2.831*** 1.956**
(8.98) (0.66) (5.29) (4.86) (1.53) (5.11) (2.96)
    41-50 2.471*** 1.173 3.903*** 2.420*** 1.375 3.151*** 2.676***
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TABLE 9: CRIMINAL FINES—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
(11.25) (0.68) (6.97) (5.92) (1.86) (5.46) (4.01)
    50+ 2.646*** 1.263 3.893*** 2.448*** 1.465 3.552*** 2.995***
(6.98) (0.96) (6.42) (5.40) (1.93) (5.91) (3.50)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
1.262* 1.947* 0.771 0.631 1.683 1.299 1.591
(2.19) (1.99) (-1.08) (-1.66) (1.88) (0.57) (1.29)
Duty Counsel 1.301** 0.841 1.019 1.013 1.410 2.927** 0.980
(2.81) (-0.62) (0.08) (0.05) (1.33) (2.64) (-0.07)
Legal 
Expenditures
1.004*** 1.005** 1.006** 0.999 1.007*** 1.005* 1.003
    (in $10s) (8.26) (2.87) (2.95) (-0.39) (4.17) (2.09) (1.81)
Observations 337035 27095 12299 26585 23597 19917 133378
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
G. CRIMINAL FINES
As with sentence length, defendant demographics have a similar effect on amount 
of criminal fines. As shown in Table 9, female defendants paid smaller fines, on 
average, as did defendants below the age of 21. Across the province, compared 
with defendants represented by retained counsel, defendants represented by duty 
counsel paid higher fines on average, as did defendants representing themselves. 
Within cities, these differences were often small and not statistically significant, 
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although individual cities (e.g., Hamilton) showed significant differences between 
duty and retained counsel. 
The relative success of retained counsel in Table 9 suggests that they provide 
greater returns when the likely sanction is fines as opposed to incarceration. 
Looking at fines for the particular offences of theft/robbery and DUI (Table A5 
and Table A6, respectively, in the Appendix) bear this out. For theft/robbery, the 
more likely sanction is a jail sentence; accordingly, the effect of type of lawyer on 
fines is smaller and—in most instances—not statistically significant. Conversely, 
the point estimates for duty counsel are larger and statistically significant for DUI 
offences across the province, reflecting the fact that fines are a more common 
form of sanction for DUI offences than jail sentences.
V. DISCUSSION
Our analysis shows that case outcomes for minor criminal offences vary widely 
across the province, and that geographic and legal factors strongly correlate with 
these outcomes. Defendants in certain cities (e.g., Toronto) receive systematically 
lower punishment than others. Women receive systematically lighter punishment 
than men across offences, including the probability of jail, length of sentence, 
and imposition of fines. Similarly, defendants younger than 21 are more likely 
to avoid jail time, serve shorter jail sentences than older defendants, and pay 
smaller fines. A defendant’s punishment is also closely correlated with the type 
of legal representation received. Self-represented defendants typically receive 
lighter sentences than represented defendants; within the class of represented 
defendants, duty counsel, on average, correspond with lighter sentences than 
retained counsel.
It is important to fully acknowledge the limitations of our data. Case 
outcomes depend on factors beyond those included in our model. Most notably, 
we do not observe the facts of each case. The stronger the Crown’s case against a 
defendant, the greater the likelihood of conviction and, in many instances, the 
longer the length of sentence. The strength of the Crown’s case in turn likely 
influences the defendant’s form of representation.
  More systematically, heterogeneity in the defendant population by city may 
account for differences in sentence length. For example, it may be the case that the 
defendant population varies across cities. The census population demographics 
reported in Table 4 reveal that cities differ from one another with respect to 
income, unemployment, and crime severity index. That said, these aggregated 
differences do not map neatly onto differences we observe in case outcomes.
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We also do not observe institutional actors. As noted by criminologists,50 
local legal culture is important. Judges may vary, either individually or by city, 
in how they adjudicate these offences. Even though only a small fraction of cases 
end at trial, these judicial differences, if they exist, influence the plea-bargaining 
process. They may also influence the actual length of jail sentence. For example, 
a judge has discretion to take into account the length of time a defendant may 
have spent in remand, effectively offsetting some of the defendant’s net sentence.51
The police may also provide another explanation for differences in case 
outcomes. While the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) provide 
policing in most provinces, Ontario is an exception in that it maintains its 
own provincial police services.52 Within Ontario, police departments may vary 
in their enforcement of specific offences. Differences in police behaviour may 
operate through more nuanced channels, with significant effects. For example, 
assume each city experiences the same distribution of criminal conduct (a strong 
assumption) and that police are either selective (meaning they exercise discretion 
whether to arrest for each offence) or categorical (meaning they arrest for all 
known offences) in their enforcement. This difference in police strategy will 
inevitably influence the distribution of cases that actually appear in court and the 
subsequent case outcomes.
Furthermore, Crown attorneys, or even an entire Crown office, may have 
different norms of charging defendants. For example, they may vary in their use 
of the Direct Accountability program, a non-court resolution to criminal charges 
in which the Crown exercises discretion in whether to refer defendants to this 
program.53 Such differences may explain why a higher fraction of defendants are 
jailed in London relative to Hamilton or Toronto. Similarly, LAO may differ in 
how it allocates defence counsel resources across the province. For example, its 
decision to routinely staff duty counsel in some court jurisdictions but not others 
will likely influence defendants’ choice of legal representation.
Equally important to note from our results is that the relationships we observe 
may be merely correlational and not causal. For example, our results consistently 
show that unrepresented defendants fare better than represented clients. This 
phenomenon is, in all likelihood, an artifact of case selection. Defendants often 
50. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
51. See Statistics Canada, Trends in the Use of Remand in Canada, by Lindsay Porter & Donna 
Calverley (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011) at 17.
52. See Julian V Roberts & Michelle G Grossman, Criminal Justice in Canada: A Reader, 4th ed 
(Toronto: Nelson Education, 2012) at 29. Quebec also has its own provincial police force. 
53. See Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “JOT Initiatives” (13 November 2015), 
online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/jot/jot_in_action.asp>.
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eschew representation because they perceive the weakness of the Crown’s case 
against them, a belief substantiated by the relatively high percentage of cases 
resulting in their receiving an acquittal or the Crown dropping the case entirely. 
Even other factors where we observe consistent effects on case outcomes 
are open to competing interpretations. For example, women systematically 
receive lower punishment than men: This finding may reflect that women are less 
culpable than men, or have committed fewer total offences (relevant to sentence 
length); alternatively, it may reflect the fact that the Crown, judges, or juries 
systematically exercise more leniency towards women than men.
At this point, we are agnostic whether judges, police, the Crown, or LAO 
systematically affect case outcomes. But because we do not observe individual-level 
variation on these dimensions, we cannot rule out the possibility that they do. If 
so, these actors collectively raise concern regarding litigants’ equality before the 
law. Our inability to determine their true effect warrants closer examination of 
the potential influence of institutional factors.
Our analysis generates some stark findings that cannot be readily dismissed 
as spurious or inconsequential. A defendant’s sentence correlates in large part 
with the type of legal representation received. Defendants represented by retained 
counsel are more likely to receive a jail sentence and serve longer sentences than 
defendants represented by duty counsel or without representation. The import of 
this result is not primarily the disparity itself, which may largely reflect selection 
on case severity, but rather the variation across cities. In London, the probability 
of receiving a jail sentence is 22% lower for duty counsel than for retained 
counsel (Table 7) but only 1% in Toronto for the same comparison. As it turns 
out, Toronto spends 54% ($654) more per certificate case than does London. 
Toronto’s additional expenditures on certificate cases may partially explain a 
narrower gap in outcomes between retained and duty counsel.
Variation across cities relating to defendants’ demographic characteristics 
similarly invites closer scrutiny. Female defendants fare better than male defendants 
across the province (Table 7, showing women 11% less likely to receive a prison 
sentence; and Table 8, showing sentence length only 29% compared to male 
defendants), but the gender disparity is even higher in Toronto (12% less likely 
and 27% sentence length compared to male defendants). When looking at theft/
robbery (Ottawa) or DUI (London), differences across cities are even greater. 
Unobservable case characteristics, while almost certainly important, 
are unlikely to fully explain our results. While it may be the case that female 
defendants have fewer aggravating factors than male defendants on average, it is 
difficult to believe that Ottawa and Oshawa are so different on this dimension to 
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account for the markedly lower incarceration rates for females in Ottawa. Our 
data militate against this conclusion. We examine garden variety and generally 
low level offences, which invites more systematic adjudication and sentencing. 
Furthermore, we are skeptical whether aggravating factors—such as culpability of 
concurrent offences—drive our results. In a separate specification (not reported), 
we look only at cases where the defendant is charged with a single offence. The 
point estimates are comparable to the full data and are statistically significant.
Accordingly, we exercise caution in interpreting what the data can and cannot 
tell us. Our results are limited in what they can say definitively, to be sure, but 
expose differences in case outcomes that warrant more systematic and rigorous 
analysis. In a province where all defendants are subject to the same set of laws, 
why do outcomes vary significantly by city? For example, why are defendants in 
London two times more likely to serve a jail sentence than defendants in Oshawa, 
even though cases process faster in London than in Oshawa (Table 2)? Similarly, 
why do defendants represented by retained counsel fare so much better in Ottawa 
relative to duty counsel in other cities (Table 7)?
Our results, while preliminary, do not implicate intentional bias or 
discrimination at the institutional level. Nevertheless, they reveal that defendants 
of a certain gender or age cohort experience different outcomes depending on the 
city that adjudicates their case. Two possible explanations for these disparities are 
that Crown offices and the police (or even individual Crown attorneys or police 
officers) may differ from one another in their charging practices; and similarly, 
that courts in a given city (or individual judges) may differ in their view towards 
criminal defendants. 
Our results are consistent with the view that the quality of legal representation 
may vary considerably within and across cities. Cities differ in their spending 
across all forms of publicly funded defence counsel, and these differences have a 
statistically significant effect on case outcomes. Lawyer representation cannot be 
easily captured by expenditures, but our results show that expenditures matter, 
and invite closer examination. To further complicate matters, these disparities 
may exist not only across cities, but they also may be relative to the quality of 
Crown prosecutors in each city.
If designated the social planner, our policy objective would be to construct 
a criminal justice system where similarly situated defendants receive the same 
outcome. Toward that end, we would attempt to eliminate institutional and 
structural factors that bias certain classes of defendants over others. We would 
identify existing policies that improve the efficiency of case adjudication, from 
both a time and quality perspective.
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The challenge is in knowing where to begin. Our results show that defendants 
charged with the same statutory offence receive different sentences, depending 
on both the city where they allegedly committed the offence and what type of 
representation they received. Based on the available data, we cannot isolate the 
effect of each factor.
Our results, however, also suggest that legal representation is a promising 
place to start. In particular, there are two questions we would ask: What type(s) of 
legal representation achieve the best outcomes for defendants, and what are their 
costs? The optimal delivery model for legal services depends on both dimensions. 
Neither Ontario, nor other provinces to the best of our knowledge, has 
systematically examined this question. For example, the same rigour examining 
local legal culture in other countries54 could be replicated in Canada.
The stakes for addressing this question are undeniably high. LAO spent over 
$315 million for legal representation in 2011,55 with $187 million dedicated to 
legal aid certificates alone.56 The private bar has a stake in the status quo, under 
which it which receives most of LAO’s expenditures on legal representation. Other 
actors, however, have reason to explore potentially more efficient delivery models 
of legal services. The Government of Ontario funds over 90% of LAO’s operating 
budget, including expenditures for legal representation.57 Given the seemingly 
abundant demand for LAO’s services but finite resources, both LAO and the 
government could benefit from maximizing its return on legal expenditures. 
Whether these existing differences raise challenges under the Charter is beyond 
the scope of this article, but understanding these differences—and addressing 
them when warranted—is compelling as a matter of policy.
A modest place to begin would be to closely examine case files for a random 
subset of cases across the province. While qualitative in nature, this approach 
could provide some insight into how different types of lawyers operate—within 
and across cities. In addition, these files would shed light on the behaviour of 
Crown prosecutors and judges. 
The most rigorous approach to evaluating the efficacy of different forms of 
legal representation is through random assignment. Within the category of duty 
counsel, defendants could be randomly assigned to per diem and staff counsel, 
and within the pool of lawyers for each type, defendants would be randomly 
assigned. Randomization provides a clean and straightforward evaluation: 
54. See e.g. Ostrom et al, supra note 26.
55. See Legal Aid Ontario, 2011/12 Annual Report (Toronto: Legal Aid Ontario, 2012) at 27.
56. See ibid at 16.
57. See ibid at 26.
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Differences in case outcomes can be attributable to the attorneys themselves. Any 
observed differences could then be viewed in relation to the costs of providing 
these services. 
Retained counsel presents a greater challenge because randomization is 
more difficult to achieve. Defendants in this category have wide latitude in 
choosing their lawyer, and lawyers in this category have latitude in choosing 
whether to take on a case. This inquiry is further challenged by the presence of 
full-time LAO staff lawyers who represent defendants at some stage of criminal 
proceedings. Duty counsel fulfill some of the duties of public defenders, but only 
some of their activities. LAO could, however, implement a pilot program where 
defendants eligible for certificate legal representation are randomly assigned to 
one of its certificate lawyers or full-time staff lawyers. Any approach involving 
randomization, however, requires program design—and some up-front costs—
not merely ex post evaluation. To the extent that organized interests militate against 
such an experiment, the challenges are considerable, but not insurmountable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides strong evidence that for criminal cases involving common, 
relatively low-level offences, outcomes vary widely across the province. These 
variations cannot be easily explained by defendant characteristics or population 
demographics, but appear to correlate strongly with the city in which the defendant 
commits the alleged offence and the type of legal representation received. Our 
results are consistent with the claim that the quality of legal representation varies 
considerably across cities, in ways that lead to real differences in a defendant’s 
probability of jail and the duration of sentence. 
People can disagree over the appropriate amount of punishment in criminal 
cases, but within a given jurisdiction, this amount should not turn on where the 
defendant happens to have committed the offence. Given existing discrepancies, 
the challenging next step is to more precisely identify the contributing factors 
and to develop policies to reduce them. While individual defendants may benefit 
from any reforms, so too does the public through greater confidence in the 
fairness of the criminal justice system.
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VII. APPENDIX
TABLE A1: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE FOR THEFT/
ROBBERY—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female -0.181*** -0.257*** -0.133*** -0.197*** -0.123*** -0.280*** -0.195***
(0.00256) (0.0105) (0.0174) (0.00964) (0.00852) (0.0163) (0.00389)
Age
    21-25 0.139*** 0.236*** 0.122*** 0.174*** 0.117*** 0.167*** 0.140***
(0.00718) (0.0266) (0.0342) (0.0199) (0.0233) (0.0405) (0.0123)
    26-30 0.218*** 0.380*** 0.196*** 0.218*** 0.116*** 0.314*** 0.243***
(0.00765) (0.0236) (0.0345) (0.0206) (0.0245) (0.0383) (0.0131)
    31-40 0.236*** 0.379*** 0.167*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 0.323*** 0.292***
(0.00663) (0.0220) (0.0338) (0.0193) (0.0219) (0.0346) (0.0112)
    41-50 0.234*** 0.388*** 0.168*** 0.0824*** 0.135*** 0.307*** 0.309***
(0.00684) (0.0219) (0.0386) (0.0201) (0.0225) (0.0352) (0.0111)
    50+ 0.104*** 0.214*** -0.00232 -0.107*** 0.0617** 0.175*** 0.192***
(0.00751) (0.0273) (0.0471) (0.0213) (0.0241) (0.0419) (0.0125)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
-0.223*** -0.165*** -0.0844 -0.182 -0.182*** -0.345*** -0.216***
(0.00362) (0.0557) (0.107) (0.131) (0.0181) (0.0558) (0.00472)
Duty Counsel -0.271*** -0.100 -0.158* -0.0867 -0.154*** -0.189* -0.410***
(0.0105) (0.0620) (0.0831) (0.161) (0.0289) (0.101) (0.0278)
Legal 
Expenditures
-0.00129*** -0.000603 0.000870 0.00212 -0.000503** 0.000712 -0.00195***
    (in $10s) (6.94e-05) (0.000443) (0.00121) (0.00163) (0.000255) (0.000760) (0.000129)
Observations 95,510 9,050 2,944 9,740 5,347 3,652 41,898
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TABLE A1: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE FOR THEFT/
ROBBERY—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
TABLE A2: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE FOR DUI—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female -0.0473*** -0.0575*** -0.0399*** -0.0758*** -0.0521*** -0.0506*** -0.0312***
(0.00234) (0.00575) (0.0103) (0.00908) (0.00726) (0.00959) (0.00416)
Age
    21-25 0.0606*** 0.0787*** 0.0948* 0.00299 0.0712** 0.0737* 0.0143
(0.00982) (0.0270) (0.0506) (0.0247) (0.0336) (0.0448) (0.0147)
    26-30 0.118*** 0.128*** 0.169*** 0.0820** 0.129*** 0.104** 0.0531***
(0.0120) (0.0340) (0.0615) (0.0338) (0.0417) (0.0513) (0.0183)
    31-40 0.147*** 0.182*** 0.176*** 0.0967*** 0.172*** 0.141*** 0.0666***
(0.0114) (0.0342) (0.0544) (0.0323) (0.0388) (0.0517) (0.0179)
    41-50 0.185*** 0.226*** 0.219*** 0.143*** 0.219*** 0.163*** 0.0920***
(0.0124) (0.0370) (0.0583) (0.0348) (0.0414) (0.0507) (0.0209)
    50+ 0.162*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 0.0730** 0.206*** 0.155*** 0.0856***
(0.0129) (0.0387) (0.0602) (0.0316) (0.0447) (0.0527) (0.0220)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
-0.0301*** 0.00508 0.100 -0.0587** -0.0835*** -0.0472 0.0110
(0.00548) (0.0764) (0.161) (0.0269) (0.0252) (0.0429) (0.0156)
Duty Counsel -0.0151** 0.0453 0.0450 -0.0555* -0.0655* -0.0351 -0.00214
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TABLE A2: WHETHER DEFENDANT RECEIVES JAIL SENTENCE FOR DUI—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
(0.00609) (0.0935) (0.106) (0.0316) (0.0341) (0.0537) (0.00984)
Legal 
Expenditures
-4.51e-05 0.000128 0.00136 -9.41e-05 -0.000938 0.000173 -2.91e-05
    (in $10s) (5.45e-05) (0.000597) (0.00108) (0.000395) (0.000790) (0.000598) (7.43e-05)
Observations 54,917 5,970 2,195 3,282 5,204 3,497 14,823
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
TABLE A3: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE FOR THEFT/ROBBERY—
SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.196*** 0.252*** 0.394*** 0.324*** 0.128*** 0.179*** 0.209***
(-34.17) (-13.83) (-8.00) (-16.26) (-14.76) (-12.96) (-23.41)
Age
    21-25 1.931*** 2.903*** 2.248*** 2.184*** 2.580*** 0.933 2.030***
(6.09) (5.19) (3.89) (6.67) (3.54) (-0.25) (3.88)
    26-30 3.212*** 4.509*** 3.409*** 3.188*** 2.502*** 2.027* 4.384***
(10.32) (8.04) (6.09) (8.48) (3.47) (2.38) (7.96)
    31-40 3.644*** 5.061*** 2.833*** 2.257*** 4.175*** 2.052** 5.363***
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TABLE A3: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE FOR THEFT/ROBBERY—
SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
(12.03) (8.62) (5.20) (6.90) (5.45) (2.61) (9.48)
    41-50 3.776*** 4.607*** 2.571*** 1.665*** 4.162*** 1.976* 5.035***
(11.97) (8.53) (4.33) (4.10) (5.38) (2.49) (9.27)
    50+ 1.872*** 2.098*** 1.077 0.839 2.430** 1.336 3.038***
(5.54) (3.62) (0.24) (-1.02) (2.78) (0.90) (6.11)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
0.108*** 0.422* 1.497 3.538 0.0544*** 0.0774** 0.0642***
(-13.37) (-2.03) (0.61) (1.09) (-4.44) (-2.89) (-9.74)
Duty Counsel 0.205*** 0.611 0.748 4.938 0.181** 0.288 0.0875***
(-9.67) (-1.21) (-0.46) (1.45) (-2.76) (-1.56) (-9.62)
Legal 
Expenditures
0.995*** 0.999 1.017* 1.029** 0.998 1.003 0.989***
    (in $10s) (-5.10) (-0.42) (2.26) (2.72) (-0.46) (0.48) (-7.92)
Observations 95510 9050 2944 9740 5347 3652 41898
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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TABLE A4: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE FOR DUI—SELECT CITIES
(2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.270*** 0.173*** 0.237*** 0.141*** 0.180*** 0.319*** 0.228***
(-12.82) (-6.93) (-4.32) (-6.41) (-7.32) (-4.01) (-5.75)
Age
    21-25 2.864*** 16.57*** 6.012** 0.851 3.834* 4.909** 1.839
(4.65) (6.26) (3.04) (-0.30) (2.46) (3.09) (1.10)
    26-30 4.005*** 17.79*** 16.41*** 1.350 4.820** 3.442** 2.906*
(6.65) (6.85) (4.33) (0.61) (2.94) (2.61) (2.17)
    31-40 5.692*** 45.77*** 28.19*** 2.195 8.474*** 4.905*** 2.984*
(8.88) (9.41) (5.51) (1.64) (4.33) (3.63) (2.31)
    41-50 9.311*** 90.45*** 49.74*** 4.421** 20.76*** 6.542*** 5.003***
(11.49) (10.99) (6.81) (2.92) (6.12) (4.39) (3.39)
    50+ 8.532*** 71.92*** 31.61*** 2.573 13.55*** 8.944*** 6.682***
(10.83) (10.43) (5.91) (1.91) (5.24) (5.03) (3.99)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
0.448*** 0.103 0.731 0.181 3.437 0.259 1.259
(-4.25) (-1.13) (-0.15) (-1.79) (0.70) (-0.90) (0.53)
Duty Counsel 0.660* 0.260 0.304 0.187 3.768 0.165 1.113
(-2.49) (-0.74) (-0.61) (-1.86) (0.80) (-1.26) (0.35)
Legal 
Expenditures
0.999 0.985 1.004 0.998 1.018 0.994 1.000
    (in $10s) (-0.85) (-0.89) (0.17) (-0.30) (1.08) (-0.48) (0.19)
Observations 54917 5970 2195 3282 5204 3497 14823
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TABLE A4: LENGTH OF DEFENDANT’S JAIL SENTENCE FOR DUI—SELECT CITIES
(2007–2013)
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
TABLE A5: DEFENDANT’S FINES FOR THEFT/ROBBERY—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.297*** 0.405*** 0.229*** 0.382*** 0.208*** 0.389*** 0.259***
(-16.62) (-4.75) (-5.88) (-9.51) (-6.94) (-4.03) (-10.16)
Age
    21-25 2.918*** 0.690 1.098 1.353 6.388*** 5.814*** 4.154***
(7.10) (-0.88) (0.22) (1.57) (4.28) (3.93) (4.00)
    26-30 3.631*** 0.897 2.263 2.516*** 5.669*** 5.853*** 5.453***
(8.51) (-0.25) (1.95) (4.29) (3.79) (3.74) (4.78)
    31-40 4.650*** 0.971 2.624* 2.430*** 6.526*** 5.593*** 7.394***
(10.78) (-0.07) (2.46) (4.83) (4.46) (4.20) (6.14)
    41-50 5.291*** 1.148 7.891*** 3.081*** 9.446*** 4.965*** 9.160***
(11.81) (0.33) (4.74) (5.84) (5.10) (3.94) (6.82)
    50+ 6.190*** 0.880 6.595*** 3.026*** 3.829** 11.73*** 12.17***
(9.75) (-0.29) (4.12) (4.78) (2.72) (5.26) (6.82)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
0.997 0.614 0.785 1.061 5.057 12.02 0.990
(-0.01) (-0.48) (-0.20) (0.04) (1.76) (1.91) (-0.02)
Duty Counsel 1.193 0.307 1.556 1.723 4.149 27.70** 0.655
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL630
TABLE A5: DEFENDANT’S FINES FOR THEFT/ROBBERY—SELECT 
CITIES (2007–2013)
(0.81) (-1.25) (0.38) (0.35) (1.66) (2.80) (-0.67)
Legal 
Expenditures
1.004* 0.999 1.009 1.003 1.017** 1.016* 1.000
    (in $10s) (2.57) (-0.23) (0.63) (0.19) (2.88) (2.10) (0.08)
Observations 95510 9050 2944 9740 5347 3652 41898
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
TABLE A6: DEFENDANT’S FINES FOR DUI—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
Demographic Characteristics
Female 1.006 1.014 1.015 1.009 1.007 0.961 0.962
(0.57) (0.52) (0.36) (0.25) (0.19) (-1.27) (-1.45)
Age
    21-25 0.993 1.006 0.963 1.013 1.006 1.051 1.022
(-0.41) (0.16) (-0.63) (0.27) (0.10) (0.80) (0.47)
    26-30 0.993 1.010 0.984 0.947 1.073 1.077 1.011
(-0.43) (0.24) (-0.25) (-1.06) (1.19) (1.14) (0.23)
    31-40 1.021 0.952 1.002 1.079 1.086 1.151* 1.071
(1.26) (-1.21) (0.03) (1.55) (1.49) (2.23) (1.48)
    41-50 1.056** 0.972 1.040 1.073 1.130* 1.160* 1.141**
(3.28) (-0.68) (0.66) (1.37) (2.20) (2.37) (2.81)
    50+ 1.057** 1.053 0.981 1.108* 1.101 1.101 1.087
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TABLE A6: DEFENDANT’S FINES FOR DUI—SELECT CITIES (2007–2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ontario Ottawa Thunder Bay London Oshawa Hamilton Toronto
(3.22) (1.25) (-0.32) (2.01) (1.66) (1.52) (1.71)
Legal Representation
No Legal 
Representation
1.185*** 0.569* 0.668 1.121 1.215 0.836 1.480***
(5.85) (-2.06) (-1.44) (1.12) (0.80) (-1.16) (5.77)
Duty Counsel 1.313*** 0.631 0.923 1.189* 1.214 0.963 1.375***
(10.35) (-1.80) (-0.32) (1.97) (0.85) (-0.27) (5.90)
Legal 
Expenditures
1.001*** 0.996 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.001***
    (in $10s) (4.50) (-1.79) (-1.05) (0.40) (-0.12) (-1.60) (3.55)
Observations 54917 5970 2195 3282 5204 3497 14823
NOTES: The dependent variable is the amount of the defendant’s criminal fine, reported as 
incident rate ratios (IRR). Z test statistic is indicated in parentheses. For Age, the omitted 
baseline is a defendant at or below 20 years of age. For Legal Representation, the omitted 
baseline is the defendant represented by retained counsel. Duty Counsel includes both salaried 
and per diem attorneys. Retained counsel includes both certificate and private counsel. Legal 
expenditures are averages (in constant 2013 dollars) for given city and year based on LAO 
expenditures for its duty counsel and certificate counsel. All models include controls for year, 
type of offence, number of charges, and number of appearances. Column 1 includes controls 
for the court in which case originated. Single, double, and triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
